1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

established at every qaḍhā and naḥiya; and the Kurds, in turn, supplied many officials and soldiers to the Empire. The educated class, in contrast to the Arab provinces, was small; there was no Kurdish intelligentsia, save for rare individuals in exile; the educated Kurd in his home or in government service became, at this period, in culture and sentiment a Turk. Their tribal organization, on the other hand, with compact and barely accessible communities of a thousand to fifty thousand souls, was likely to conform to a government administration only if the latter were sympathetic, strong, and flexible. In fact, the tribesmen in wide areas still showed a far truer loyalty to their own leaders than to Turkish officialdom; they remained, by great majority, unassimilable and uncooperative; and the wholesale insecurity which resulted from their preferred way of life could not, it seemed, be reduced by any system of indirect rule which Turks would authorize or Kurds accept.

Sharing racial origins with these, the Yazidis resembled them in type and habit. Their main concentration was in the Jabal Sinjar, fifty miles west of Mosul, but their holiest place, Shaykh 'Adi, lay in the Mosul plain. Their numbers, never formidable, had been reduced by the active antipathy of their Kurd and Arab neighbours; it was excited by the outwardly churlish Yazidi character, still more by their non-Muslim religion of devil-propitiation—if their hotch-potch of religious tenets be rightly understood—and by their close community autocracy. Though they still refused equally subjection and assimilation, their long history of major revolt and violence was at an end. The Yazidis, alleged to be mere heretics, never formed a Millet (Milla) in the Ottoman Empire.

The Turkomans, village-dwelling cultivators without tribal organization, were found in numbers in the towns of Kirkuk, Altun Kupri, Arbil, and Kifri, in the villages (Qara Tepe, Tuz Khurmatu, Daquq) along the Baghdad–Mosul trunk road, and at Tall 'Afar midway between Mosul and Sinjar. These Turkish-speaking folk, perhaps descendants of frontier-guards placed there by 'Abbasid Caliphs, were famed for no special gifts or prowess, but had long contributed a host of effendis to the bureaucracy and enriched village and countryside by their quiet industry and sound sense. Some known Baghdadi and a few provincial families were of Turkoman blood. Their future history could be foreseen as one of gradual absorption in the Arab majority. The same was true of the small community of the Shabaks on the Tigris south of Mosul; they spoke a Kurdish dialect and were thought to profess a heretical type of Shi'ism.

If these Kurd, Yazidi, and Turkoman minorities were confined almost entirely to the Mosul wilaya, the case was otherwise with

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

4. 'IRAQ SOCIETY: THE TOWNS

During the span of a single lifetime, from 1830 to 1900, profound changes had come to pass in the urban society of 'Iraq. Most marked in the upper classes, but perceptible in the lower, they radiated from both outwards into a countryside still socially primeval.

Early in the nineteenth century 'Iraq town society had remained almost wholly isolated from Western influences. There was no acquaintance with the outside world. The tempo of life was that of earlier ages, traditional manners held the field, and life in every relationship was based on Islam. No restless progressiveness had appeared: the evils of the times were accepted by all with submissive fatalism. The impact of Western conceptions and activities upon this society was in the Levant gradual, in 'Iraq relatively sudden. Such ideas and phenomena came first to 'Iraq by way of the New Army which had, in a day, superseded Janissaries and Hayta bands: an army with Europeanized officers, soon followed by doctors, engineers, and the whole body of Westernized effendis. The senior officials, Turkish in speech and half-European in education, were accompanied by wives of Istanbul and children fresh from modern-fashioned schools. Posts and telegraphs, foreign trade and enterprise began to operate. The Christian and Jewish minorities, with their European leanings, continued to set a higher standard of education, aided by the missions which served them.

The cumulative effect of these influences had produced by 1900 an 'Iraqi urban society far removed from that of a lifetime earlier. Fed by the telegraph, an incipient press, and the resident foreigners, the talk amongst officials in the Saray, merchants and agents in the coffee-shop, notables in their diwans, could for the first time embrace wider interests. Literacy had become commoner, changes had appeared in domestic and social habit, European clothes were worn by an increasing minority, the tempo of life accelerated. The wealthy class increased in numbers as in possessions, and found fresh ways of spending. Social leadership was still on patriarchal or plutocratic lines; an intelligentsia scarcely existed; but among a widening circle the old acquiescence had begun to yield to dissatisfaction and questioning. An excessive confidence was felt in 'science' and modern knowledge, conceived always as a set of formulae with miraculous efficacy. Except where devotion to orthodox Islam and its endowments was a vested interest, there had been signs of diminished respect for that doctrine and for its professors; but this was still very far from a landslide to atheism, nor had the old standards of behaviour been yet abandoned even by the *évolués*.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The social development which these processes entailed represented no steady internal evolution, had been sought by no part of the population, and corresponded to no inventiveness of spirit. It had been imposed from without, partly by pressure of world discoveries such as steamship and telegraph, partly by the largely unintended impact of the West at many points, partly by Government action; and it had been accepted without discrimination. Ideas of doubtful value, glib catchwords from European politics, social observances strange to the East, had been welcomed because new, with little knowledge of their significance. There was no care for the true bases of European thought or virtue.

Meanwhile it was all too obvious that 'Iraq society, whatever the merits, the humanity or social gifts of its members, was afflicted by serious evils. The level of enlightenment was low by any standards, gross superstition was rife, women were treated as inferior beings. Security was uncertain even in the towns, thanks to unpunished crime and the survival of a bullying fanaticism directed, in bad times, at the minorities. Malnutrition was the lot of four-fifths of the population. The infant death rate was among the highest in the world. Many diseases were endemic because untreated, and combined to produce a race physically mediocre or inferior; such were malaria, sand-fly fever, bilharzia, hookworm, dysentery, typhoid, smallpox, the venereal diseases, and epidemic cholera. And dominating all lay the pervasive curse of poverty, removable only by fundamental changes in the whole territory's economy. A new spirit, new use of resources, almost a new race of men would be needed before this evil could be cured by a realization of the country's vast possibilities and by a new social attitude. 'Iraq in 1900 was a society of blighting shabbiness, low standards, and all the vices of the hungry and unsatisfied.

In appearance and amenities the 'Iraqi towns had by 1900 changed little for centuries. The same locally varying building materials, the same design of house, mosque, and bazaar, the same traditional ornamentation united the planless and crowded settlements of the nineteenth with those of the sixteenth century. Streets nowhere permitted the passage of wheeled traffic; huddled narrow lanes provided bare space for donkeys or porters to carry their loads. Only a few new buildings, and these of ancient pattern, varied the limits of the older towns or formed the new Basra suburb of 'Ashar or the 'Amara river front. Baghdad remained within its line of rubble heaps which had been walls, Mosul had spread the beginnings of a new quarter outside its narrower ring; the walls of Basra were in ruins, those of Kirkuk or Arbil barely remembered. The bazaars and warehouses, commercial heart of the townships, were guarded by watchmen-contractors whose

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

wielded by the Shi'i mujtahids—doctors of the law—was formidable not only in 'Iraq but throughout Persia, where their word was always important, sometimes decisive, in the highest decisions of State. These divines, nearly all Persian by nationality, with their considerable wealth, their adulation by the simple, their concourse of pupils and followers—the more, since theological students were exempt from conscription—formed the nucleus of an unassimilable element in 'Iraq society and politics: anti-Sunni, anti-Turkish, anti-progressive, all-powerful over the Euphrates tribes, they could be neither placated nor ignored. Meanwhile the violent local politics of these towns were controlled by 'town Shaykhs' by no means holy, and by street gangs among which the famous Zugurd and Shumurd of Najf were notorious.

Although no region or social stratum in the territory was without its acquaintance with religion, its civilized and traditional social observances, and its lively imitative intelligence, yet manifestations of an intellectual or cultural life were rare. The general level of information regarding the world, past or present, and that of æsthetic appreciation, was low even among the literate classes of the towns; in the tribes, ignorance was profound. The arts were represented by a narrow range of traditional music, a few remembered Arab songs, the modern verses of two or three respected poets, geometrical decoration in brickwork, and the humblest of handicrafts. Disinterested learning could be found in rare scholars of the minority communities (such as Father Anastase the Carmelite), and among members of the upper-class families—Basha'yans, Alusis, Gaylanis, 'Umaris—who maintained domestic libraries and composed histories of their town or family. Of publishing, book production, or generally readable literary output there was nothing save the dull official newspaper. Archaeological excavation, 'Iraq's greatest claim to learned interest at the time, was to 'Iraqis an ignored or suspect mystery. The professional classes—lawyers, doctors, military officers—had acquired from Turkish sources a modicum of specialized knowledge reaching no standard admissible in Europe; in other branches of applied knowledge—agriculture, engineering, economics—there was nothing or almost nothing to show. Theology and ecclesiastical history stood in a class apart; in the Sunni 'religious' families it represented a body of authentic learning, in a field limited by its narrow tradition and the rejection of originality; in Shi'ism, and above all at the Holy Cities, these studies were synonymous with learning itself (since no others existed) and almost with virtue. Pursued for a lifetime of memorizing and arid pedantry, and attracting hundreds of pale disciples destined for lives of sheltered and endowed religion, this medieval learning of Shi'i dogma and tradition formed the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

impassable mountain or swamp. The governing authority was foreign, unloved, and deadly poor. None but a minute fraction of the population was ready to welcome efficient government; the greatest part repudiated it as alien to their ways and interests. The 'Iraqis were and are of independent, individualistic character, unaccustomed to control. Faction in the towns and endless tribal warfare had been the rule for centuries. The deep division between town and tribe was itself a major obstacle to uniform administration; to it was added the gulf between the Sunni and Shi'i communities. Such was the territory which for four centuries the Ottoman Government, acclaimed almost universally by Western opinion as the world's worst, had been trying to administer.

The Government of 1900 of which we speak, and its approach to these problems, differed indeed essentially from that of three generations earlier. In the original form of Ottoman rule, which was pure Oriental despotism, all power was the Sultan's. He stood at the head of an elaborate hierarchy of stratified functionaries, and was represented by governors locally as autocratic as himself. Rule was for his sole benefit and grandeur; no law existed save the Shara', capriciously enforced; no limit or appeal restricted the local powers of Wali or Mutasallim. All posts were for sale, including those of the highest functionaries.

Changes in this régime had been forced upon the Ottoman dynasty early in the nineteenth century by its military defeats, which compelled it to invoke European military teachers. And while successive Sultans were led by this necessity to rebase the conception and machinery of Government with a new body of law and procedure and a new class of officials, other modernizing agencies were at work: those of trade and shipping, educational foundations, travellers, missions, modern communications, and a press. To this impact of the West urgency was imparted by the attitude of Turkey's European creditors and the reaction in Europe to the miseries of the Christian provinces successively detached from the Empire. Under such pressures was evolved the half-modern, pretentious, overburdened, needy Turkish Government of the nineteenth century. For seventy years before 1900 'Iraq had enjoyed the blessings of 'reformed' Government, had seen its Administration modified first on paper and then in fact, with every new meticulous Ordinance in Midhat Pasha's revised wilaya system. With regulations to apply and functions specialized, a numerous and influential class had come into existence, the effendis. Neither landowners nor merchants nor divines, they were of a middle and secular class, complacently urban. 'Iraqi by race except in the highest posts, the effendis formed a great part of the social element receptive of Turkish culture, and acted as the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

VII

AL-ISTIQLAL AL-TAMM

1. ASSESSMENT IN 1932

PREVIOUS chapters have shown how great a distance 'Iraq had travelled by 1932 from its age-long status as a group of three remote and backward Turkish wilayas in northern Arabia. The moment of its completion of twelve years as a constitutional State since the first 'Iraq Government was set up, and its achievement of full independence, may not be ill chosen for an assessment of its accomplishment and its prospects as they then appeared.

A Kingdom of 'Iraq had been created, and was world-recognized. It had secured beyond future questioning its northern third—the Mosul wilaya—claimed with determination by others; it had fixed or was fixing its boundaries to east and west; it had gone far to establish with its neighbours firm and friendly relations, the perfecting of which should be no formidable task for succeeding years. Within 'Iraq, the nation enjoyed great and evident advantages. It had neither a menacing over-population like Egypt, nor an exiguous territory like the Lebanon, nor a mere handful of oases in vast deserts like Sa'udi Arabia. It had abundant space, great rivers, famous fertility, a healthy if severe climate, and the certainty of increasing population. Its people were in no way below the average of humanity in moral qualities, and above it in intelligence. The appreciation of possible progress and the desire for it were widespread. And in the matter of administration, whatever disobedience or local disloyalty might lurk within its borders, the Baghdad Government's claim to authority was disputed by no rival pretensions; its rule was effective in nearly the whole territory.

At this point, however, reflection suggests some qualification: the picture of peaceful unquestioned sway over all 'Iraq is too favourable. The areas of Arab steppe and Kurdish mountain in which the writ of Government scarcely ran can indeed be ignored: its power would doubtless extend into these with developed forces and communications, and with time. But much must be altered before the 'Iraqi public in the main areas of the country came to resemble, for better or worse, that of a modern nation in which Government could operate with beneficence, and which would both permit and appreciate such operation. Without insistence on a uniformity which could be valueless or deadening, the political health and administrative manageability of a nation are inconsistent with the presence either of enclaves of too deeply diverse cultures

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

182 563 795 or loyalties, or of excessively disparate levels of social development, and in 'Iraq there existed both unassimilated minorities and outstanding differences in the level of evolution between social classes. References have been made elsewhere to the problem presented by the Kurds' character, tradition, habitat, and language and their separatist ambitions, whether of powerful tribesmen or of the intelligentsia of Sulaymaniya. Assyrians, Yazidis, and resident Persians all represented heterogeneous, ill-absorbed elements. The inter-sectarian asperities of the Christian Churches were unimportant, but not so that deep, historic cleavage of Sunni and Shi'i which was for ever dividing and embittering the political world. If by and after 1932 Shi'i leadership was less fanatical and less foreign, the 'Ulamā of Najf yet retained much power and Shi'ism was still the unifying force, the super-tribal loyalty, of an uprising and unsatisfied bloc; and on the Euphrates, too often as the ally of a decentralization not far from anarchy, it was a main embarrassment of the Government. The existence and vitality of these distinct minorities and self-conscious cultural groups remained a feature adverse to 'Iraq's progress.

181 511 But, minorities and sects apart, it was clear that the 'Iraqi masses were as yet in no full sense citizens of their country. The lower classes, even in town and suburb, were deeply ignorant and miserably poor and, while not strange to some of the visible phenomena of Government, were neither able nor tempted to take their part in a democratic régime for the control of their own destinies. In the tribes, who still formed the great bulk of the population, ignorance was yet deeper, environment more primitive; and their feudal or patriarchal conception of society was wholly at variance with the citizen's outlook in a modern State. The tribal population of 1932 was in essentials scarcely changed from the level of its fathers; the constitutional progress of the 'Iraq State had far outstripped any social or material progress of this major part of its people.

185 Nevertheless, for all who were accessible to Government's efforts and willing to come within its orbit, much had been done. An Army and a police force had been formed adequate to internal needs and likely, with such development as succeeding years would bring, to be able to guarantee security of life and property. The administration of justice was generally satisfactory, and future years, it could be hoped, would increase its accessibility and popular confidence in it. The country's material problems and potentialities had been, for fifteen years, studied and analysed by modern eyes and brains: hopes had been revealed, dangers appreciated, and experience stored. The backwardness of its agriculture could be corrected, it seemed, by feasible new methods and cul-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

642 therefore, nor to any Western observer did it occur in 1920 not to install the forms of government both familiar at home and seemingly demanded in 'Iraq. Nevertheless, this most exacting of constitutional forms was now seen to be acclimatizing itself in 'Iraq with difficulty and with mixed immediate results. If it is true that the virtues of the system are everywhere appreciated, and no better alternative has been discovered by the modern world, yet, to be in fact representative and democratic, it demands certain conditions. 181 Did these exist in 'Iraq? There was, certainly, a long Arab tradition 665 of tribesmen's democracy and easy access to rulers. Free 204 speech, a vigorous and copious press, busy parties, 'demonstrations' in every street and school: all these could be claimed as democratic features of Baghdad life. But with what truth? The press was ill informed, irresponsible, rabidly partisan, crudely xenophobe. The demonstrations were organized, easily and cheaply, at any politician's direction. The parties were, so far, mere cliques of personalities, without continuity or breadth of organization or any consistent policy unless that of mere Anglophobia. Freedom of speech was allowed to extreme, rarely to moderate, views; violence or boycott awaited the exponent of any policy, however wise or sincere, if it seemed to fail in nationalist fervour. It was indeed doubtful whether one educated 'Iraqi in a hundred conceived society on truly democratic lines or, given power, would have wished so to organize it. Their nature was individualistic and insubordinate, their tradition authoritarian, and the conditions in 641 their society inimical to democracy. The representatives in the 666 Chamber itself were in fact selected less by the votes of an instructed electorate, which did not exist, than by the nomination of the Cabinet in power; the list conveyed to the Mutaṣarrifs as that of Government-sponsored candidates was, with infrequent exceptions, that of the Deputies.

642 It resulted that in 1932 the Government of 'Iraq consisted of 662 a façade of democratic forms behind which, emerging from the stresses, strains, and violences of faction and egoism, operated the actual power of a small ruling class: a class which contained on the one hand more than enough figures capable of filling the ministerial posts available, but on the other too little variety of viewpoint to compete for power by the advocacy of genuinely alternative programmes. The result was an uneasy shuffle of offices, short-lived Cabinets with a brief innings for everybody, and the fortunes of Ministries dependent not on the attitude of representative Deputies capable of a gesture of dismissal, but on personal faction behind their backs. It was already clear that if ever the only authoritative hand not involved in these uneasy intrigues should be removed—that of the King—there would be opportunity, or almost inevita-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

tive followings. Both, while moderately reformist and relatively responsible, were founded less on a body of agreed principles than on the personalities of their leaders, on their hopes of freedom from disturbance and on a natural fear of sudden and unpredictable changes. The official programmes of all the parties were of remarkable similarity; the blending of ambition and personal self-seeking with idealism and high principle was perhaps not greatly different in each; some had few, some had no provincial branches, though the two last mentioned were by far the widest in extent of support; all recited the greatest blessings which, in the whole field of national life, they would desire for their people, and stated these to be their programme. Party bitterness was nourished chiefly by the impatient resentment of the Independents and the National Democrats at the continued dominance of the satisfied property-owning and power-possessing strata of politics, with their penchant for the West and Great Britain, their restrictions on the press, their control (through the executive) of elections, and their irritating failure to produce the millennium forthwith. Between the moral level and the patriotic sincerity of all parties there was probably little to choose. Most leaders and writers were both less violent and more persuasive when in private conversation they substituted reasonable grievances and much social charm for the meaningless and often crudely false rhetoric of their speeches or leading articles. Nuri Pasha remained the only statesman of international stature, and one of the very few to have profited from a full generation of realistic experience at home and abroad.

In the probable absence for many years of political parties based on genuinely differing yet practicable programmes, and on country-wide organizations making them reasonably representative of the electorate, it was difficult in 1950 not to anticipate that Cabinet Government would long continue, and with it the rootless precariousness of a régime which seemingly at any time a successful intrigue, or a military coup d'état of too familiar a pattern, could subvert.

Constitutional or political weaknesses apart, there were, it appeared, other factors present which must preclude easy optimism as to that sole condition for the fulfilment of all the country's hopes —the stability and continuity of its Government. The first of these factors was the unchanged Arab character which, with all its charm, intelligence, and responsive sympathy, is by its impatience and its rejection of give-and-take peculiarly ill adapted to the stresses, the restraints, and the needed compromises of modern politics and Government. The second was the nature of local nationalism which, violent and narrow, suspicious and over-sensitive, self-praising and unrealistic, had lost nothing of the

3: Clark S-S (1950) 1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

smaller urban and semi-urban communities, the country is essentially rural and dependent upon agriculture. There are, it is estimated, some 35,000 square miles of cultivable land, only twenty per cent of which is cropped in any one year. The country is watered by the two rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, and is amenable to great irrigational projects. Some large-scale and subsidiary irrigation schemes have been developed and others are under way. Until capital is available, however, to bring much more water to much more land, large areas of potentially arable and pasture land will continue in a state of unexploited fertility.

With the exception of a minority who dwell in the towns and smaller urban communities, the population is sparse and much of it mobile. Out of a total population of some 5,000,000 roughly twenty-two per cent live in urban areas, forty per cent in settled rural communities, thirty per cent in semi-settled rural areas, and eight per cent are nomadic.

The educational and other social problems and needs of the country can only be appreciated if it is realized that Iraq is predominantly rural in character and modes of life and, minor industries and developing oil projects apart, is dependent upon agriculture for its existence. There is a certain amount of industrial activity connected with drink, tobacco, soap, vegetable oils, foot-wear, bricks and a few cotton ginneries, but, generally speaking, the industrial capacity remains undeveloped. Oil output, however, is rapidly increasing, and the royalties from this industry have already made a valuable contribution to badly needed capital works.

Racially, the inhabitants may be roughly divided into seventy-seven per cent Arabs, seventeen per cent Kurds, three per cent Jews, the remainder being Turcomans, Yazidis and Assyrians. The number of Jews has, however, decreased by recent emigration into Palestine. The inhabitants may be further divided into distinctive religious groups, ninety-three per cent being Muslims, three per cent Jews, slightly less than three per cent Christians, the remainder being of miscellaneous faiths. Despite these marked religious differences, a feature of the public educational system of Iraq is its great religious toleration.

Generally speaking, although the inhabitants are distributed into distinctive racial and religious groups, they seem to share some important characteristics which, to the educator, are hopeful and significant. A visitor to the country cannot but be impressed with the great natural courtesy, friendliness and open-hearted hospitality invariably shown by people of all ranks and groups. In addition to these socially valuable characteristics, many of the people exhibit a quickness of response which, in those who have passed

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

through institutions of higher education, seems to develop into an extraordinary mental agility. Those who are politically articulate share a high concern for the future of Iraq as a nation.

A visitor to the country is also struck by a number of contradictions. Iraq has a brilliant cultural inheritance, yet the bulk of the population is illiterate. It is a country of great economic possibilities, yet the majority of the people exist at a meagre standard of life. The soil is of high fertility, yet it continues to be farmed by primitive methods. Above all, although the future prosperity of the country depends upon the application of science and power to the land, agricultural development is inhibited by a most unsatisfactory system of land tenure.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRIMARY EDUCATION

Primary education on any large scale in Iraq is of recent growth. It began with the traditional Arabic mullah school, in which small groups of boys under the direction of a religious teacher memorized religious lore in a monotonous and repetitive manner. Traces of this verbal technique are still obvious in many of the primary schools.

Under the Ottoman régime the nucleus of a schools system was introduced, and it is said that by 1913 there were some 6,000 children attending primary schools of a sort. Soon after the next military conquest the British promoted some further educational development and, in particular, substituted Arabic instead of the alien Turkish language as the medium of instruction. By 1921 there were reputed to be more than 15,000 children attending public primary schools.

It is significant, however, that no real approach to a system of public primary schooling was made until the nation took its educational affairs into its own hands. Since the meeting of the first Iraqi Parliament in 1925 a real impetus appears to have been given to the development of primary education. By 1931 there existed 316 public primary schools with an enrolment of some 35,000 pupils. By 1950 extraordinary quantitative progress had been made, for by that year 175,000 children were enrolled in over 1,000 public primary schools.

THE LAW AND ADMINISTRATION OF PRIMARY EDUCATION

By 1940 the development of primary education, and of higher education, had gone on at such a pace that it was necessary to

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

NATIONALISM BEFORE 1914

In spite of arrests in the middle of October of leaders of the Arab Movement, including Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī, Shaikh Sa'īd Effendi, Hamdī Beg Pāchahjī, Mahmūd Beg, head of *Nadī' Watanī*, or Native Land Club, and Bahjat Beg, fresh demands for decentralization were formulated. A general conference to meet at Kuwait in early 1914 to consider Arab questions was proposed in November. Representatives of Amīr Ibn Sa'ūd and of the Sharīf of Mecca, with whom Saiyid Talib had long been in correspondence, and Amīr Ibn Rashīd of the Shammar, Shaikh 'Ajaimī of the Muntafiq, the Shaikh of Kuwait and Saiyid Talib were to be among the delegates. Ibn Sa'ūd, in response to the invitation, replied that when the time came to rise he would be ready, but that the moment had not come.[1] Neither he nor the other Arab potentates were as yet able to sink their personal ambitions and enmities in the common cause. The conference was never convened.

In this same inability to make common cause seems to lie the failure of Arab Nationalism to make even greater progress before 1914 than it had actually made. In no way did the essential individualism of the Arab character reveal itself more than in these early days of the Arab Movement. In spite of the correspondence and interchange of views between the various sections of the Arab world, in spite of the manifestos and literature issued in the name of the Arab peoples, in spite of the essential unity of the aims and purposes of Arab Nationalism, the Movement tended to break into sectionalism, limited by the horizons of immediate locality. The rank and file of the Movement, no less than the sectional leaders, regarded with mistrust any leaders whose ascendancy seemed to overshadow their own interests and to detract from their own importance. Personal rivalries, religious differences and sectional animosities thus hampered the progress of the Movement, stultifying its efforts and nullifying its effectiveness. Nevertheless, the Movement

[1] The statement in *The Times*, December 27th, 1913, that the Arab chiefs had composed their differences proved to be unsubstantiated by facts.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

found to be entirely preoccupied with the classical and literary tradition. It is true that the Arab mind has a flair for language and literature and delights in oral self-expression, and young children learn to read and write quickly and speak with a fluency and feeling for words which children of other lands would find difficult to emulate. But with the increased importance of science and technology and the need of improving productive efficiency in industry, agriculture and other occupations, the people of Iraq cannot afford to remain content with a system of education which does not equip the younger generation to play its part in the projected plans of development.

Once educational authorities clearly recognize that the introduction of activity-centered methods and curricula and of craft work is basic to the whole idea of educational reconstruction, it should not be difficult to work out the necessary measures. In many other countries, such a reorientation of education has been actually achieved, and not only detailed theoretical discussion but records of concrete, practically worked-out schemes are available for consultation and guidance. It will, of course, not be possible—and even if it were possible, it would not be desirable—to copy these methods and schemes mechanically, because education is a creative field in which ideas have to be applied to the particular situation in which one is working. It will be necessary for Iraqi educators to work out their own pattern of "activity schools" and their appropriate forms of craft work. In fact, some gifted educators have already envisaged this problem in its true perspective. Dr. Matta Akrawi's thesis on *Curriculum Construction in the Public Primary Schools of Iraq* (published in 1942) is an effective presentation of the case for reorganized methods and curricula breaking with the narrow academic tradition. What is more, it gives concrete instances of how units in social studies and health education can be worked out in such a way as to break down the barriers between schooling and life.

What kind of crafts can be introduced in the village and city schools which will appeal to the children and will also be related to their environment so that they can leave school with trained skill and aptitudes and participate effectively in the work of their communities? The answer to this question can be given only after

59: Allen et al 8-3 (1952-53) 1953 Mi Middle East
Iraq m#1

OW and write to obtain more information. Most rural people have not yet learned such 369 fundamental principles as crop rotation to enrich the land, the concept of germs, 311 or the principles of infection and contagion. Under their circumstances they have not been able to acquire a growing store of knowledge or of experience to pass down for the advancement of each successive generation. In other words, the people of rural Iraq have had little cultural heritage or growth.

5. Attitudes and Social Organization

369 Also fundamental to their poverty are attitudes derived from their social 366 position and relationships with their sheikhs and landowners. Virtually imprisoned by their condition of total dependence and debt, rural people have developed deep ● 181 feelings of powerlessness and futility. Many of these attitudes stem from a 178 weakening of historical tribal relationship in which there were greater reciprocal obligations between leaders and the people. Now they become unbalanced when the traditional tribal social system degenerates as sheikhs abandon their tribal responsibilities and take tribal lands as their personal possessions. The tribesman becomes detached from his social group. His dependence becomes greater upon the whims of his sheikh. This leader feels less and less obligation as the state and local governments assume those responsibilities for the welfare of the people which the sheikh formerly performed.

III. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF RURAL PEOPLE

OW A. A PROBLEM REQUIRING TOTAL GOVERNMENT ACTION

The causes of the rural problems as briefly described obviously indicate that nothing less than a full scale attack upon them by all ministries and agencies of the government will bring about the desirable changes and improvements. Economic and social development of the rural people is not only necessary for their own welfare but for the welfare and progress of Iraq as a whole. A national economic and social development programme for rural peoples under the co-operative planning and direction of government leaders is needed. This programme should integrate into single, national, social plan of action the present and planned government activities of land and water development. The provisions should include as well as new plans for making ownership of farms available to tenants and landless people, credit, accessible to these small farmers at reasonable rates, instruction in new agricultural practices, establishment of public health and professional medical services available for all people, provision of education for every child, advice and demonstration in the improvement of housing, instruction in home and child care, establishment of social services for the needy, ill, blind and orphaned, construction of access roads to allow marketing of farm products from every village, development of village industries and the organization of communities for participation in an ultimate direction of their local affairs. This will take time, effort, money, careful study and planning, and increased inter-ministry and agency co-operation before it can be put into effect. The information and skills now exist to undertake this national campaign. It is a programme on which national leaders and with technical assistance from abroad can unite in their thinking and their efforts to build a solid agricultural economy as the foundation of Iraq.